China hawks fear that the current policy of official ambiguity sends mixed signals about U.S. intentions and thus makes it harder for the United States to deter an invasion. Proponents of ambiguity fear that an explicit commitment would, at best, cause irreparable damage to U.S.-Chinese relations and, at worst, increase the likelihood of an invasion. While extending public guarantees to Taiwan might reassure some U.S. allies, others might react with alarm.  

The answer to the question ultimately depends on two considerations: first, the probability that China will attack in the status quo and, second, how Washington expects to respond to an invasion.  

If the United States does not intend to defend Taiwan, then it would be a pretty bad idea to extend explicit security guarantees—except if Washington hopes that an “all bark, no bite” policy will deter an attack. The downside risk is the potential, and potentially significant, damage to Washington’s credibility should China call its bluff. Maintaining ambiguity likely reduces that downside risk while still providing some level of deterrence.  

On the other hand, if Washington intends to use force—or if U.S. policymakers believe that the American military would ultimately come to Taiwan’s assistance—then that suggests taking steps to enhance deterrence, including through explicit security guarantees.  

I am not qualified to assess the probability that an invasion is already in the cards. I am not a China expert; I do not have access to U.S. intelligence. However, I think the logic is pretty straightforward. If those who can make the call conclude that a future attack is likely, and if we also think that Washington (as seems very likely) would respond with military force, then it makes sense to enhance U.S. deterrence—including by unambiguously and unequivocally pledging to defend Taiwan.

  Indeed, if the United States is already “all in” on the defense of Taiwan, then it should, if Taipei asks, look for a way to establish (by fait accompli) some kind of military presence on the island. Causing a backlash in China is ultimately less dangerous than a world in which Beijing decides to invade because it convinces itself that the U.S. military will remain on the sidelines. 

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